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PUNISHING THOUGHT: A NARRATIVE
DECONSTRUCTING THE INTERPRETIVE
DANCE OF HATE CRIME LEGISLATION
ANNE B. RYAN*

INTRODUCTION

We don't see things as they are, we see things as we are.
-Anais Nin'
The motives behind the state law may have been to do good.
But the same can be said about most laws making opinions
punishable as crimes. History indicates that urges to do good have
led to the burningof books and even to the burning of 'witches.'
-Justice Hugo L. Black'
History is comprised of narratives which suggest how we have
become who we are. We also learn from hindsight, and try to
make ourselves and our world a better place by learning from our
mistakes and correcting past injustices.3 But history, like any
other story, is inherently subjective. Some argue that our present
reality is similarly subjective because it is a narration woven from
imprecise language through individual perceptions.!
*

J.D. Candidate, 2002; B.A. Psychology, The University of Notre Dame,

1990. The author is grateful to Professor Joel Cornwell for his time, patience
and expertise, Tom Comstock and the Board for editorial assistance, and Sage
Fattahian, Donald Ryan and Marion Ryan for their support and
encouragement as she labored. This Comment is dedicated to Tony Lawton
with whom I have found four loves.
1. Anais Nin, in QUOTABLE WOMEN: A COLLECTION OF SHARED
THOUGHTS, (Running Press, 1989).
2. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 274 (1952).
3. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Cardozo in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS
511, 520 (Clarence Morris ed., Univ. of Penn. Press, 1959) (noting that judges
decide which laws should be extended or restricted by evaluating, in part,
social welfare and public policy).
4. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Storytelling: Foreword: Telling
Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2090 (1989) (considering the effect language
has on determining the validity of the perceptions of events that humans
experience on a day-to-day basis and construe as real life, if there is such a
thing). Scheppele states,
[blut how does one know truth when one finds it? Truth isn't a property
of an event itself; truth is a property of an account of an event. As such,
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The challenge to maintain our jurisprudential integrity
compels us to ensure that current legislation and legal decisions fit
within the framework of our nation's Constitution. This task is
not always an easy one. The interpretation of past decisions and
statutory regulations is really an interpretation of human
decisions made by human perception and expressed through
human language.
There is an intrinsic subjectivity in this
analysis which one cannot adequately resolve without using some
of the tools that civilized people have cultivated to explore these
queries, philosophy and psychology.
Part I of this Comment enters the arena of hate crime
legislation by discussing three pivotal decisions rendered by the
United States Supreme Court. In doing so, Part I will introduce
the reader to the First Amendment issues at stake and the
interpretive dilemmas which are inherently a part of hate (or bias)
crime statutes.5 Part II will explore the implications of hate crime

it has to be perceived and processed by someone, or else it couldn't be

framed in language to count as an account at all.
Id.
See also Joel R. Cornwell, The Confusion of Causes and Reasons in Forensic
Psychology: Deconstructing Mens Rea and Other Mental Events, 33 U. RICH. L.
REV. 107, 111 (1999) (recognizing that language is imprecise and cannot be
considered absolute truth or the representation of an absolute truth). Rather,
language is a tool that we use to give meaning to the perceptions and
experiences of our lives without pausing to realize that this tool that we use is,
in and of itself, a circular and redundant perplexity. Id. Cornwell explains
this by stating,
[tihe delimitations of logic confine language to varying degrees of
imprecision. In order to eliminate all traces of ambiguity, language
would need validation from something outside itself, some superior form
of thought free from any form of signification. But without some form of
signification there can be no language, and without language, there can
be no thought.
Id.
5. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Regarding
the interpretive dilemma, one must consider the difference between punishing
intent, a classic mens rea analysis, and punishing thought or speech, which is
protected by the First Amendment. See generally Abby Mueller, Comment,
Can Motive Matter?A Constitutionaland Criminal Law Analysis of Motive in
Hate Crime Legislation, 61 UMKC L. REV. 619, 625-26 (1993) (recognizing the
necessity of determining if the legislation punishes thought, which has been
determined to be unconstitutional, and the questions necessarily raised in
order to distinguish between motive and thought). For additional insights on
the distinction between thought and motive and their relation to the
discussion at hand, see also Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An
Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1015, 1017-19 (1997).
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legislation through the narrative perspective in psychology.' This
branch of psychology, and its relation to legal discourse regarding
hate crime legislation, demonstrates how people see and explain
the world.7 Such a world vision is subjective.8 Part III follows
with an investigation into philosophical reasoning, focusing on the
inefficiency and arbitrary nature of words and language,
particularly through the insight offered by deconstructionists.'
Because words lack universal meaning, the stories told in the
courtroom are even less reliable.'0 Finally, Part IV proposes that
hate crime legislation, albeit grounded in good intent, is
unconstitutional.
The United States Supreme Court's recent mandate of a jury
determination beyond a reasonable doubt for enhancement
statutes" renders assessment of bias crimes a theoretically
impossible task for our legal system to contemplate. Therefore,
despite the valuable desire to rid our national conscience of biasrelated wrongs by punishing the wrongdoer, we shall have to
abandon legislation that differentiates between offenders and
undermines our constitutional system, and return to more
traditional approaches of punishment.
I.

SETTING THE STAGE

Indecencies directed toward African-Americans"', women",

6. See Jan M. Van Dunne, Narrative Coherence and Its Function in
Judicial Decision Making and Legislation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 463, 464-65

(1996) (giving the historical root of the term and pointing out that the concept
has been adopted and integrated in to a myriad of fields, including law,

literary criticism, history and ethics, as well as psychology). See generally
GEORGE S. HOWARD, A TALE OF Two STORIES: EXCURSIONS INTO A NARRATIVE
APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGY (Academic Publications, 1989).
7. See generally HOWARD, supra note 6.

8. Id.
9. See

generally

Benjamin

Graves,

Deconstructionism,

at

http://landow.stg.brown.edu/post/poldiscourse/spivak/deconstructionism.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2000) (defining deconstructionism); Jack M. Balkin,
Deconstruction's Legal Career, copyright 1998 by J.M. Balkin, at

http://yale.edu/lawweb/j balkin/articles/deccar1.htm
(1998)
(discussing
historical changes that deconstructionism went through from literature to
philosophy to law); Jack M. Balkin, Being Just with Deconstruction, edited
version
in
3
SOCIAL
AND
LEGAL
STUDIES
393
(1994),
at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/beingjust1.htm
(1994-99)
(applying deconstructionism to questions of law and justice). See also Joel R.

Cornwell, Legal Writing as a Kind of Philosophy, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1091
(1997) (presenting an interesting perspective on legal writing and how it is
taught in today's law schools from a deconstructionist philosophical
perspective).
10. See Cornwell, supra note 4, at 129 (identifying a defendant's intent as
.a subjective pattern of appropriating a person's very humanity").
11. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000).
12. See, e.g., PETER JENNINGS & TODD BREWSTER, THE CENTURY, 33-42,
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Jews 14, people of Middle-Eastern descent 1 , and many other ethnic
groups16 have plagued our nation since its inception. As our
collective conscience matures, our country strives to ensure that
the "land of liberty" is not a misnomer. Hate crime legislation was
intended to address such problems, but has fallen short of its mark
and threatens the very liberties that our nation holds so dear.
Hate crimes are defined as "criminal acts committed against
particular victims because of the assailant's perception of the
victim's race, national origin, religion, or other bias-motivated
classification."17 A vast majority of states have enacted legislation
to punish bias-motivated crimes.18 Many of these legislative acts
were based on the Anti-Defamation League's model 9 , which
operates to "enhance" a pre-existing criminal conviction and
sentence. 20 The United States Supreme Court has now decreed
that enhancement statutes which originally allowed a judge at
sentencing to increase penalties for a factor not determined as an
element at trial (other than recitivism) are unconstitutional.2
When enacting and enforcing hate crime legislation, some states
used an alternative method, the "separate crime ethnic
intimidation statute."" This type of legislation seeks to address
hate crimes as separate offenses, where the concept of "hate" is an
element of the crime23 ; as distinguished from the enhancement
348-56 (1998) (narrating on the racial oppression of African Americans in the
United States in the early part of the twentieth
commentary on the struggle for desegregation). See
NAACP, at http://www.efn.org/ -naacp/ (last visited Oct.
13. See, e.g., The 9 to 5 National Association of

century, as well as
also Eugene, Oregon
13, 2000).
Working Women, at

http://www.9to5naww.qpg.com (last visited Oct. 13, 2000) (offering services
and information to women coping with harassment and discrimination).
14. See, e.g., The American Association for Affirmative Action, at

http://www.affirmativeaction .org (last visited Oct. 13, 2000) (fighting to end
discrimination against people of Jewish ancestry and promoting affirmative
action for all minority groups).
15. See, e.g.,

The Iranian American Anti-Discrimination Council, at

http://www. antidiscrimination.org (last visited Oct. 13, 2000) (promoting the
interests of Americans of Iranian and Persian descent and discouraging
discrimination on the basis of middle-eastern ancestry).
16. See generally The National Council of La Rasa, at http://www.nclr.org

(last visited Oct. 13, 2000) (created for and by Hispanic Americans); Chinese
for Affirmative Action, at http://www.caasf.org (last visited Oct. 13, 2000)
(setting forth a goal to eliminate social conditions fostering bigotry and
discrimination against Asian Americans).
17. Rosemarie A. Micacci, Comment, Wisconsin v. Mitchell: Punishable
Conduct v. Punishable Thought, 21 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 131, 133 (1995).

18. Mueller, supra note 5, at 620.
19. Id.; Micacci, supra note 17, at 135 n30.

20. Micacci, supra note 17, at 133.
21. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
22. Micacci, supra note 17, at 134.

23. Id.
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statutes, where the criminal offense is already established and the
"hate" allows for increased penalties to be assessed. 24 For the
purpose of this Comment, references to bias crime legislation refer
to those states that have traditionally used enhancement statutes
which allow the judge to increase the penalty above the statutory
maximum set for the base crime. Under the new rule, states will
be forced to adopt a system where bias is an element of the offense,
25
and can sustain the same burden of proof as any other element.
The line has been drawn in the sands of hate crime
legislation, with legal scholars and commentators taking their
There are a number of different
positions on either side.2"
arguments against hate crime legislation, including a statement
by Doran Peters, the Managing Editor of the American Journal of
Criminal Law, that "sound policies have been overwhelmed with
the rhetoric of political correctness."27 Professor James Weinstein
posits that enhanced penalties for hate crimes are merely a "part
of a larger American syndrome of adopting harsh punishment as
an expedient response that deals only with the most superficial
Some
manifestations of complex deep-seated problems. " 28
commentators, such as Anthony Dillof, J.D., L.L.M., focus on
morality and a general right of all people to be free of wrongdoing;
those infringing on such rights deserve equal punishment
regardless of the victim's status.29 Judge Abrahamson, one of the
dissenters in the Wisconsin v. Mitchell case, acknowledged a

24. Id.
25. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 490.
26. See, e.g., Dillof, supra note 5 (examining bias crimes in light of
liberalism and determining that bias crimes, when viewed from this
perspective, do not stand on solid ground); Steven G. Gey, What if Wisconsin v.
Mitchell Had Involved Martin Luther King, Jr.? The ConstitutionalFlaws of
Hate Crime Enhancement Statutes, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1014 (1997)
(arguing that despite the ruling upholding the constitutionality of the statute
in Mitchell, the statute was unconstitutional in light of the First Amendment);
but see Shirley S. Abrahamson et al., Words and Sentences: Penalty
Enhancement for Hate Crimes, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 515 (1994)
(discussing her personal feelings regarding the case as a presiding judge, and
giving information and perspectives representing both sides of the story);
Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality:Why the Critics of Hate
Crimes Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739 (1999) (surveying and
responding to critics of hate crime legislation, Taslitz surmises that these
types of legislation are socially justified and important to the moral character
of our nation as a manner of combating racism).
27. Doran D. Peters, Revealing the True Nature of the Hate Crime
Movement, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 387 (1999).
28. Abrahamson, supra note 26, at 525 n37 (quoting James B. Weinstein
from his article First Amendment Challenges to Hate Crime Legislation:
Where's the Speech? CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, 55, 60 (1992)).
29. Dillof, supra note 5, at 1034 (reasoning that both offenders have the
same degree of culpability regarding the intent of the crime committed and
thus deserve the same degree of punishment).
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disturbing observation made in the NEW YORKER that "hate crime
statutes may be disproportionately enforced against minority
group members.""
The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States 3' not only protects freedom of speech, but according to
popular interpretation, also safeguards the freedom individuals
enjoy regarding their thoughts.32 Each person's thoughts are
protected as a fundamental right, even if such thoughts offend
another. 3 There are, however, some exceptions to the right to free
speech and thought. 4 For the purpose of this analysis, the
exception of "fighting words" is relevant." The content of the
"fighting words" is incidental. 6 The essential analysis of "fighting
words" revolves around the notion of "a particularly intolerable
(and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the
speaker wishes to convey."37 Stated another way, "the unprotected
features of the words are, despite their verbal character,
essentially a 'nonspeech' element of communication."38
For
example, an ordinance may prohibit obscenity generally, but not
on the basis of content directed at one group and not another.39
This distinction means that a municipality could forbid certain
unacceptable modes of speech (for example, speech that incites
violence), but based upon the effects of the speech, not the racial
content.4 °
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court analyzed a city
ordinance which targeted bias-motivated crime and found that the

30. Abrahamson, supra note 26, at 525-26.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

32. Mueller, supra note 5, at 624 ("Although there are many divergent
interpretations of the amendment, the most recent rulings have interpreted it
to protect speech and thought, regardless of how offensive it may be, and to
protect symbolic speech as expressive conduct.").
33. Id.
34. Id. at 624-25 ("[Tlhere are some exceptions to the protection of speech.
'Fighting words' can be regulated, as can expressive conduct where there is an
important governmental interest, and the regulation is narrowly tailored to
address it."). For a comprehensive explanation of constitutionally proscribed
speech, see R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (resting the
decision on the court's analysis of proscribed speech and when it is or is not a
constitutionally valid claim).
35. Mueller, supra note 5, at 624-25.
36. R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377 at 393.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 386.
39. Id. at 384 (giving the example that the court's point is that "the
government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content
discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government").
40. Id. at 385 (using an example that a city could punish one for burning a
flag if there was a city ordinance against outdoor fires, but could not pass an
ordinance prohibiting dishonoring the flag).
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ordinance was unconstitutional in R.A. V.v. St. Paul.41 The Court
held that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it prohibited
speech based solely upon the subject matter.42 The Court reasoned
that the First Amendment expressly forbids a law that
discriminates against a person's viewpoint, rather than focusing
only upon the content of the "fighting words." " The Court noted
that "[t]he First Amendment generally prevents government from
proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of
disapproval of the ideas expressed.""
The following year, the United States Supreme Court settled
another dispute regarding a hate crime statute in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell.45 The United States Supreme Court heard the case after
41. R.A.V, 505 U.S. 377 (The charges against R.A.V., a teenage male, were
in response to his allegedly burning a cross in the front yard of a home owned
by an African American family). The Court eloquently summed up its holding
with the following: "Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a
cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient
means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First
Amendment to the fire." R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377 at 396. The ordinance in
question read,
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct
and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. at 380.
42. Id. at 381.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 382.
45. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). Mitchell was convicted of
aggravated battery and his sentence was enhanced due to a finding that he
chose his victim based on the boy's race. Id. at 479. Mitchell told other
African American men, who were stimulated after having watched the film
"Mississippi Burning," to "go get" a white male passerby if they wanted to
"fuck somebody up." Id. at 480. The penalty enhancement statute in question
at the time of the trial was as follows:
(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying
crime are increased as provided in sub. (2):
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under
par. (a) is committed or selects the property which is damaged or
otherwise affected by the crime under par. (a) because of the race,
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or
ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property.

(2)
(a) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a misdemeanor
other than a Class A misdemeanor, the revised maximum fine is
$10,000 and the revised maximum period of imprisonment is one
year in the county jail.
(b) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a Class A
misdemeanor, the penalty increase under this section changes the
status of the crime to a felony and the revised maximum fine is
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the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the statute was in
violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution because it
punished offensive thought.46 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
further opined that the statute was bound to have a chilling effect
because, in all likelihood, prior speech might prove the bias.47 The
United States Supreme Court evaluated Wisconsin's enhancement
statute and ruled that, in reviewing the sentence to be imposed,
judges may factor in "[t]he defendant's motive for committing the
offense."'
The Court contrasted that "a defendant's abstract
beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, may not be taken into
consideration by a sentencing judge."4 By comparing the motives
defined under the Wisconsin statute with those defined in antidiscrimination laws"0 , the Court held that the First Amendment
allows the evidentiary use of speech to establish an element of a
crime, or the requisite intent or motive, and therefore the statute
was constitutional. 51
The most recent United States Supreme Court decision
concerning a hate crime legislative act came in June of 2000,
Apprendi v. New Jersey." In Apprendi, the Supreme Court's

$10,000 and the revised maximum period of imprisonment is 2 years.
(c) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is a felony, the maximum

fine prescribed by law for the crime may be increased by not more
than $5,000 and the maximum period of imprisonment prescribed by
law for the crime may be increased by not more than 5 years.
(3) This section provides for the enhancement of the penalties applicable

for the underlying crime. The court shall direct that the trier of fact find
a special verdict as to all of the issues specified in sub. (1).
(4) This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry is
required for a conviction of that crime.
Id. at 481 nl.
46. Abrahamson, supra note 26, at 523.

47. Id.
48. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 at 485.

49. Id.
50. Id. at 487 (giving as an example Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, and pointing out that this act 'makes it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against an employee 'because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin'").

51. Id. at 489.
52. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488-90 (2000) (pointing out that

the decision made that it is unconstitutional to allow sentencing
enhancements for any issue other than recidivism to be determined by a judge
with the standard of review set at "preponderance of the evidence," did not

focus on the constitutional standing of basing an enhancement on racial bias).
However, the result of the new rule was that the Hate Crime Act in New
Jersey was rendered unconstitutional, and that "hate" would now have to be
decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. So, although the Court
stayed away from making an express ruling on the constitutionality of bias
crime legislative acts, the implication is clear. The act that Apprendi

committed involved firing a gun into the home of an African American family
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narrow decision rested in the determination of whether sentencing
enhancements that increased the maximum sentence for the
accused required a factual determination beyond a reasonable
doubt.53 The Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."54 Essentially, this means
that the hate or bias must be an element of the crime, rather than
a factor to be determined by a judge at sentencing, if it would
increase the maximum penalty." The Supreme Court's verdict in
Apprendi thus makes it more difficult for states to punish those
allegedly motivated by bias in the commission of a crime.
These varied and seemingly inconsistent decisions rendered
over the years by our highest judicial body may be due to the
Court's hesitancy to punish thought. The reluctance to punish
thought has lead to the strict standard that is a result of the
Apprendi rule. 7 Lessons taught by philosophy and psychology
regarding linguistics and perception aid in understanding the
inherent problems of bias crime ordinances. One main dilemma is
the implied or explicit "because of' extrapolation on the intent

that had recently moved into the neighborhood with the purpose "to
intimidate." Id. at 491.
53. Id. at 469 (framing the question presented as a due process issue rather
than First Amendment since the narrow issue focused around sentencing
enhancements rather than the broader, and arguably more difficult, First
Amendment claim which would have arisen under hate crime legislation).
54. Id. at 490 (stating, "[i]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove
from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that
such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.").
55. Id. at 490. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Law Enforcement and
Criminal Law Decisions, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 517, 521 (2001) (noting that the
hate-based motive is essentially a distinct crime and thus must also be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt). Chemerinsky posits that although a literal
reading of the text obviates that the Apprendi standard be applied when the
maximum penalty is increased, he believes the rationale behind the holding
would support the standard's application to enhancement within the statutory
range of the base crime. Id. at 521-22. The aforementioned rationale behind
the Apprendi Court's holding is "that it is wrong to convict a person of one
crime and impose punishment for another." Id at 522.
56. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 at 490-91 n16 (quoting Patterson v. New York
(432 U.S. at 228-229 n. 14) and asserting that "the political check on
potentially harsh legislative action is then more likely to operate").
Apparently, this dictum is the Court's way of letting the reader know that the
Court finds hate crime legislation "harsh," probably because of its propensity
to punish thought. Although the issue was not brought to the Court to review
the hate crime legislation itself, and the Court was merely asked for a review
on the sentence enhancement problem, id. at 473, one could speculate that the
United States Supreme Court, in this statement, is wary of this type of
legislation.
57. Id. at 490.
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aspect of the crime, which is significantly different than the
"because of' consideration necessary in the determination of a
Title VII discrimination charge. 5 The hate crime "because of'asks
"why?" whereas the Title VII "because of'asks "what?".59 This fact
then becomes a part of the new predicament that Apprendi
brings,
60
the perceptual pitfalls of "beyond [a] reasonable doubt."
II.

LET THE DANCE BEGIN

In analyzing hate crime legislation and its role in American
jurisprudence, one must consider the constitutional rights of all
citizens along with legislation's affirmation or neglect of these
rights.
Hate crime legislation must be grounded on an
establishment that the criminal was motivated by racial animus,
not that the accused had bigoted and hateful thoughts. 1
Otherwise, the legislation would act to punish criminals who
happen to be racists, an idea repugnant to the rights established
58. See Gey, supra note 26, at 1039-40. Title VII prohibits employers from
discriminating in the hiring practice "because of' someone's race or other
protected class. Id. at 1039. In this regard, the state is permitted to regulate
conduct; the distinguishing factor is that the employer cannot discriminate
based upon race versus a different, non-protected classification. Id. The
intent is to explain what the employer did, not his motivation for doing it. Id.
In contrast, the "because of' which is intrinsic to the hate crime legislation
passed in this nation refers to the "why" of the matter. Id. at 1039-40. Gey
sums this concept up nicely in regard to the Mitchell case by observing,
In Mitchell's case, the beating is the ultimate act that the state has
authority to prevent.
The words "because of' in the Wisconsin
enhancement statute are irrelevant to the determination of whether this
ultimate act has indeed occurred. . . . The "because of' language refers
only to a subjective reality (i.e., Why did he do it?) rather than, as in the
Title VII, to an objective reality (i.e., What did he do?)... Under the
Wisconsin scheme, the term "because of' refers purely to Mitchell's
thoughts and expression about his crime.
Id.
See also Dillof, supra note 5, at 1033 (noting that the "because of' feature of
hate crime definitions sets them apart from other types of crimes because of
the modification on the intent aspect of the crime's elements).
59. Id.
60. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
61. See Adam Candeub, Comment, Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 2071, 2116 (1994) (pointing out the "[c]ovariant [rielationship
[bletween [cirime and [a]nimus").
Candeub distinguishes between the
requisite intent for a crime such as an assault and an assault based upon
racial animus. Id. at 2115. People can grasp the mens rea necessary for an
offense such as an assault based upon childhood fights and adult observations
and conclusions (such as the conclusion that one probably intends to cause
bodily injury to another by bludgeoning him with a brick). Id. The jury is able
to analogize the requisite mens rea from personal experience and observation.
Id. Analogy does not serve the same purpose in the hate crime arena. Id. at
2116. Few people understand what it is like to base one's actions solely on
racial hatred so it is hard to accurately perceive the mental state of one who
does. Id.
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62
by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The viewpoint of the accused must be factored out, and the focus
remain entirely on the act itself.63 The inherent problem in this
type of legislative act lies in the results attained: the side-stepping
of constitutional rights through a complex perceptive and semantic
In analyzing hate crimes through this metaphor, one
dance.'
must first consider narrative perplexities regarding the
punishment of crimes based upon bias against the limitations and
guidelines of our judicial system based on the tenets of the
Constitution.

A.

The Psychological Tango into Narration

The importance and legitimacy of studying the effects of
narration began in other fields, such as psychology, and made
their way into the legal forum.6 5 Scholars in all fields who embrace
the narrative perspective contemplate the function and reasoning
behind a person's story; its plot and structure.66 Ultimately,
62. Id.
63. Id.

64. Id. Candeub states:
This distinction is essential; without it the laws would penalize
thoughts. The problem is that such a separation is difficult, to say the
least, and considering the other minds problem, it may often be
impossible. How can one distinguish between, on one hand, the racist
who happens to assault people and expressed himself as a racist before
an attack and, on the other hand, a racist whose attack was actually
motivated by racial animus? Far from being academic, this distinction
keeps hate crimes from being thought crimes. Moreover, whenever
courts make mistakes because of their essentially limited ability to infer
mental states (and because of the unverifiable nature of intents, no one
will ever be able to tell if mistakes have been made), then hate crimes
will be thought crimes.
Id.
65. Van Dunne, supra note 6, at 463 (acknowledging that the study of the
role of storytelling, or narration, developed in several fields, including
philosophy, literature and history). Narrative psychology, or the storytelling
perspective, has the same roots and is well established in the field of cognitive
psychology. See generally HOWARD, supra note 6. For more information of a
general nature concerning the realm of legal storytelling, see, e.g., Scheppele,
supra note 4 (introducing a journal dedicated to legal storytelling and its
impact on the subjective versus objective view of truth); Norman J. Finkel,
Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stewing, and Hamlet Brooding: On the Story of the
Murder/Manslaughter Distinction, 74

NEB.

L. REV.

742 (1995)

(using

traditional stories and portraying the heroes as defendants to explore the
"heat of passion" distinction between murder and manslaughter with the
analysis based on psychological perspectives); Richard K. Sherwin, A Matter of
Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV.
543 (1988) (looking at the nature of legal storytelling from the perspective of
philosophical rhetoric).
66. Van Dunne, supra note 6, at 464. Van Dunne credits the development
of the study of narration to the philosophers Ricoeur and Arendt. Id. See also
PETER BROOKS, PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND STORYTELLING 57 (Michael Payne &
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narrators believe that the way people view their world, their
interactions with others, and attempts to place
6 7 a meaning upon
these people and events is akin to "storytelling."
This perspective has obvious implications in the world of legal
courtrooms.'
Cases are won or lost based upon perceptions of
truth.69 Our criminal justice system is premised on the theory that
individuals are innocent until proven guilty. The term proof
implies objectivity.7" However, the addition of the "because of'
statement, asking "why" as opposed to "what," in hate crime
legislation and prosecution brings the burden of proof into the
subjective arena.
Many individuals make up the courtroom dance in a criminal
trial. The victim and accused, their attorneys, the judge and the
jury all have roles.71 Each of these members brings his or her own

Harold Schwier cds., Blackwell Publishers 1994) (asserting that
psychoanalytical construction acts as a bases for narrativism and discerning
its meaning). As is true in any dialogue, there is both collaboration between
speaker and listener to fashioning a clear text and struggle over its
interpretation and the form of the final product. Id. This is common in a
psychoanalytical scheme. Id.
67. Finkel, supra note 65, at 776 (explaining that the way individuals
interpret their own lives is through the telling of the story of their lives, their
personal narrative plots). George Howard, a psychologist involved in the
development of narrative psychology, is cited as explaining psychotherapy
from a narrative perspective. "[Tiherapy usually begins with an invitation to
the client to tell his or her story[.] From this 'constructive' view, 'life' becomes
the 'stories we live by,' 'psychopathology' becomes 'stories gone mad,' and
'psychotherapy' becomes 'exercises in story repair."' Id.
68. Scheppele, supra note 4, at 2075 ("Stories carry power because they
have the ability to convey truths even if the stories themselves are not the
only ways of seeing the world. Stories re-present experience, and can
introduce imagination and new points of view.").
69. Finkel, supra note 65, at 776 (asserting "real" and "stories" may not be
reconcilable concepts). Finkel points out that some social constructionists
posit that truth as an objective reality does not exist - there are only stories.
Id. See also Scheppele, supra note 4, at 2082 (acknowledging that stories may
not be different based on an objective truth countered with an objective
falsity). Rather, stories are propositions asserted to be true by two different
individuals who hold different points of view derived from differing
backgrounds and experiential bases. Id.
70. Scheppele, supra note 4, at 2088-89 (considering the objectivist theory
of truth, which promotes the belief that there is a "single neutral description of
each event which has a privileged position over all other accounts"). This
neutral "truth" is seen to be "really true" because it allegedly is without pointof-view, so it tells what really happened rather than what an observer or
participant thought to have happened. Id. at 2089-90. But the "neutral
observer's" viewpoint is just that, a viewpoint, and is no more truthful than
any other point of view, despite being a construct rather than a story, for that
construct is merely the story of what is thought to be true rather than any
objective truth. Id. at 2090-91.
71. Id. at 2085 (claiming that "legal storytelling is no less patterned than
other sorts of storytelling; indeed, it may be even more structured because it is
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perceptions with him or her into the drama. 7' Backgrounds,
upbringings, cultural and socio-economic features color individual
points of view. The colors on our palettes are well established
before the trial unfurls.
The traditional and current role of the jury is that of factfinder. The Apprendi decision governs enhancement statutes now "hate" must be considered as an element and sustains the
same burden of proof as all elements. 73 Theoretically, in a biascrime situation, the jury must not only find that the base crime
occurred,74 but also determine that at the moment of the
commission of the crime, hate was a motivating factor. 7 This is
distinguishable from simply having a background of hateful
thoughts and statements regarding the victim's protected class."
A finding based on previous thoughts and vocalizations has clear
protection by the First Amendment.77 In the current paradigm, a
jury is charged with finding that at the moment the crime 7 was
committed, the motivating factor was that of the requisite bias.
There are a number of stories told in the courtroom 79 - the
embedded in a larger institutional framework that routinizes solutions to
unusual events and that values regularity and predictability").
72. See generally Van Dunne, supra note 6, at 474 (recognizing the role that
American feminists and critical race theorist legal commentators have had on
the use of narrativism in law. Stories by women and people of color are the
focus of these scholars and less concern is placed on their accuracy than their
aesthetic and emotional dimensions); Scheppele, supra note 4, at 2096
(contrasting the neutral story with the stories told by "outsiders" - those
typically or traditionally oppressed who have different historical
perspectives, thus their narrations take on different forms).
73. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 455 (2000).
74. Id. at 457.
75. Id.; see also Finkel, supra note 65, at 778 (positing that jurors try to
explain the information presented to them by inferring both causal and
intentional links among facts). This results in varied interpretations, all with
a narrative vein, rendering them both interpretive and subjective. Id.
76. Finkel, supra note 65, at 776-77. Prior perceptions can wreak havoc in
the jurors' courtroom, as they are unable to leave these extralegal factors
outside the forum. Id. Juror's prior perceptions include specific beliefs about
crimes and criminals, and people they perceive as being bigoted or hateful. Id.
"And while these prototypes may be powerfully determinative of jurors'
verdicts, they are likely to be distorted caricatures ....
Id. at 777. See also
Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 at 475 (stating in dictum, "we reject the suggestion by
the State Supreme Court that 'there is rarely any doubt' concerning the
existence of the biased purpose").
77. Mueller, supra note 5, at 624.
78. Jurors' emotions and the relation thereof as interpreted through
different theories of cognition should be noted at this point. See generally
Finkel, supra note 65, at 768-72. One theory of cognition promotes that
thought that comes unconsciously and automatically can be fixed. Id. at 770.
Therefore, jurors' emotions at hearing certain stories in the courtroom can
lead, according to some theorists, to an inability to interrupt the emotive
process and interject reason or restraint. Id. at 769.
79. Scheppele, supra note 4, at 2082-83 (positing in law, all we have is a
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victim's, the accused's, and the tales woven by attorneys
representing both parties. Factoring these stories in with the
rules of evidence and procedure guiding the judge to allow or
disallow certain story-telling methods", the "facts" are
indistinguishable from the illusory constructs subconsciously
projected on the parties by the members of the jury. 81 Narrative
psychology, and its interpretation by legal scholars, shows us the
danger of this course of jurisprudence. The subjectivity in the
story told can prove to be outcome-determinative, regardless of the
"truth" or "fiction" of the story. 2 Intrinsic to the application of
subjective analysis by the finders of fact, these "perceptual fault
lines" leave us on shaky ground.83
Analyzing hate crime legislation through the wisdom of
scholars of narrative psychology and legal thought presents an
unsavory picture. It is a picture of a conglomeration of many
stories told from many perspectives that are then left to the jury to
discover the "truth" of what really occurred beyond a reasonable
doubt.' One could hypothesize that this analysis alone is enough
to warrant the conclusion that the due process and freedom of
speech and thought guaranteed by the United States Constitution
should intervene against hate crime legislation.85 Unfortunately,
the picture is far from complete.
B. Philosophy and the Linguistic Two-Step
The field of philosophy brings us to another hurdle in the
examination of hate crime legislation.
The story-telling
story; judges and jurors are not witnesses to events, they are witnesses to
storytellers).
80. See, e.g., Van Dunne, supra note 6, at 468 (expressing fascination in the
role of judge and how his or her personality influences the role he or she plays

and, moreover, the entire movement of the trial).
81. Finkel, supra note 65, at 776 (asserting that we place upon the jury the
burden of finding out the truth, even if this demand is beyond the perceptive

capacity of the jurors).
82. See Abrahamson, supra note 26, at 532 (acknowledging the inherent
flexibility and subjectivity in the law, Justice Abrahamson opined that "[tihe
law is not rigid. An issue can be stated in many ways and the way the issue is
phrased often determines the answer.").

83. The term "perceptual fault lines" is coined by Scheppele, supra note 4,
at 2082. She points out that even apparently stable communities which
appear to be in congruence regarding general governing rules are composed of
people coming from different backgrounds and with different points of view.

Id. When these people who unknowingly see the world in different ways all
come together in a community, apparently united in beliefs and values, there
is an underground tension which could cause rifts. Id.
84. See Cornwell, supra note 4, at 123 (endorsing the belief that a person's
internal self is composited on the criminal act in the manner of "subjective

responsibility" or subjective guilt). Although the guilty state of mind is the
object of the inquiry, it cannot be objectively seen as a fact. Id.
85. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST.amend. V.
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perspective teaches that the way we experience the world is
subjective and "facts" are colored by an individual's perceptions.8"
In addition, philosophers have long pondered narration in another
dimension, the inherent subjectivity of words themselves.87 These
two concepts are intertwined: words are the ingredients of the
stories that we tell ourselves in order to make sense of our daily
experiences, and how we find meaning in the actions of ourselves
and others.88
The narrative of the crime exists in many forms: the story
told by the accused; the story told by the victim. Arguably, the
most, in fact the only, important story is the one constructed in the
minds of the jurors." The requirements imposed by the Apprendi
decision" challenge the jury to determine the validity of the stories
presented by the cast of characters involved in the trial.' The fact
finders must inquire into the beliefs of another through a process

86. See generally Scheppele, supra note 4.
87. See generally Cornwell, supra note 4. See also Linda A Cistone-Albers,
Deconstructionistand PragmaticAnalysis Reveal the "Intent to Discriminate"
in Proposition 227 - A California Initiative, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 215, 230
(1999-2000) (acknowledging that "[a] deconstructionist approach seeks to
understand the sense or, in some cases, the non-sense of the words and their
interplay.").
88. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, LAST WRITINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
PSYCHOLOGY: THE INNER AND THE OUTER 1949-1951 (G. H. von Wright &
Heikki Nyman eds., Blackwell Publishers 1992). Wittgenstein, at the end of
his life, recorded his reflections on the relationship between the inner and
outer self, the interactions between one's mental state and his outward
behavior. Id. at x-xii (Editor's Preface). This body of work was composed in
small notebooks and were frequently unclear and abbreviated. Id. As such,
the author will combine general ideas extracted from his text with quotations
that obviate Wittgenstein's intent throughout these endnotes. "Our concepts,
judgments, reactions never appear in connection with just a single action, but
rather with the whole swirl of human actions." Id. at 56e. See also Maxine
Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1, 4 (2001) (referring to the discourse theory of postmodern philosophy,
developed by Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault). The discourse theory
assumes a world constructed by the language, concepts and ideas of humans
as opposed to an objective "mirror" view of reality. Id.
89. Cornwell, supra note 4, at 108-09 (stating "[cIritical questions about a
defendant's mental state at a particular moment in the forensic narrative,
which seem like questions of fact to be verified in a scientific mode, are more
properly seen as questions of value by which a 'fact finder' infuses meaning
into the narrative"). See also Andrew e. Taslitz, Gender and Race in Evidence
Policy: What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, 28 SW. U.L. REV. 171, 210
(1999) (acknowledging that one is unable to understand an accused's "mental
state" without first understanding his sound group's norms). Taslitz further
points out that "if mental state is primarily a linguistic, interpretive
phenomenon, then there is no mental state 'out there' to discover." Id.
90. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000).
91. See Irvin C. Rutter, Law, Language, and Thinking Like a Lawyer, 61 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1303 (1993) (interesting discourse on the interplay between law,
language, psychology and philosophy).
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of analyzing the words that the parties recall and the stories that
they have composed to make sense of the event." In this manner,
the jury must form beliefs about beliefs, speculation upon
speculation.93 Upon this the "facts" rest.
Analogy can simplify complexity. In order to understand the
theories presented, it behooves one to differentiate between causes
and reasons." Causes are likened to scientific or mathematical
reasoning: if A and B, then C.9" Reasons, on the other hand, are a
much more human construct.96 People can understand reasons as
the subjective state of mind that leads a person to act in a certain
manner.97 Theoretically, anyone can determine causes without a
grand measure of projecting a sense of one's self into the problem
at hand. 9 Reasons, conversely, are speculative and can be easily
influenced by perceptual and semantic differences between the
narrator and listener.99
In this framework, the reason, hate, by which one affects the
109
crime, is the subjective measure to avoid whenever possible.
92. See, e.g., Cornwell, supra note 4, at 109 (in judging a person, the jury
comes to the problem with their own identity bases and must use their own
individual senses of self to project onto the accused and victim that which
makes sense according to a more personal construct); Wittgenstein
acknowledges the difficulty of interpreting another's motivations even when
that person is trying to communicate that very idea. WITTGENSTEIN, supra
note 88, at 28e. ("Consider that we not only fail to understand someone else
when he hides his feelings, but frequently also when he does his utmost to
make himself understood.").
93. See Cornwell, supra note 4, at 123.
94. Id. at 110.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Cornwell describes this phenomenon as one which "is literary and
provides meaning through image connotation;" "fram[es] conduct against
common sensibilities and intuitive apperceptions;" "assumes a grammar of
reasons by giving sense through familiarity;" and "accounts for human actions
in terms of feelings and passions." Id.
98. Id. at 113.
99. The relationship between cause and reason is like the relationship
between the inner and outer self. See generally WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 88.
Wittgenstein acknowledges the difficulty of another, let alone one's self, being
able to know the inner process of humans. Id. at 84e. He asserts that one
cannot know something in the internal world or through reason as clearly as
one can know a cause, such as a mathematical equation's solution. Id. at 84e8se. However, without asserting a type of knowledge regarding the inner self
of others, human communication and life itself makes no sense. Id. For a
discussion regarding the misleading nature of declaring facts or knowledge,
see Cornwell, supra note 4, at 131-32 (explaining that claiming basic
knowledge about ourselves and our world is a concept without which we could
not exist; however, such an assertion is not always able to be empirically
proven as factual).
100. Dillof, supra note 5, at 1017 (acknowledging that thoughts in and of
themselves should never be punished). Dillof notes that the intent of bias
crime legislation is not to punish thoughts per se, but to punish thoughts that
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Surely, few philosophers would argue that the base crime, without
the element of hate or bias, established by both the actus reus as
well as the mens rea,0 can be measured solely in terms of "cause"
as previously defined. 2 The fact that criminal law requires the
finding of a mens rea weaves reasoning intrinsically into the
determination of fact. 1°3 But this primary level of determination is
firmly entrenched in our legal system, and, in its generality, does
not pose a serious threat.'O The secondary reasoning, that of the
determination of the "because of' statement, requires projection to
be based on projection and subjectivity to be compounded. 10'
It is difficult to require the jury to determine that at a
particular moment bias alone drove a person to act.0 6 This
underlie crimes. Id. The problem with this analysis is that the base crime has
already been punished, and that the bias prerequisite to a bias crime adds
additional punishment to the base crime. Id. In doing this, the law asserts
that the bias crime is worse and should incur greater punishment. Id. Dillof
asserts that both the bias-motivated criminal and the non-bias motivated
criminal have the same level of culpability and thus should receive the same
degree of punishment, for one person's safety and well-being is no different
than another's. Id. at 1034.
It is a greater wrong to punch a person than a pillow because persons
have a higher moral status than pillows. In contrast, as a general
matter, all persons have an equal right to be free from physical harm
and other sorts of wrongdoing; none may claim a superior status.
Although there may be limited exceptions (saints, innocent children,
etc.), exceptions should not be a function of race, color or religion. This
claim follows from the principle of equality that as all are created equal,
race, religion, and national origin are morally irrelevant. Accordingly, it
is no greater (or lesser) wrongdoing to steal from a Black than a White
and no greater (or lesser) wrongdoing to punch a Jew than a gentile.
Id. at 1034-35.
101. "The actus reus ["guilty act"] is the physical aspect of the crime,
whereas the mens rea (guilty mind) involves the intent factor." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 36 (6h ed. 1990).
102. See generally Cornwell, supra note 4 (basing throughout his article an
analysis of causes and reasons on the mens rea necessary for a criminal
conviction).
103. Dillof, supra note 5, at 1017 (noting that the mens rea as a statement of
intent is used to determine the appropriate sanctions).
104. See Dillof, supra note 5, at 1017 (acknowledging that the determination
of an accused's mental state is central to the determination of the mens rea,
one element required in criminal law). Dillof recognizes that the mens rea
targets the intent of the accused and the thoughts upon which the underlying
act is based. Id. However, he astutely recognizes that the thought
requirement for mens rea is very general, as opposed to the specific findings of
beliefs and values central to bias crimes. Id. This type of finding, Dillof
asserts, is not congruent with traditional mens rea analysis. Id.
105. See Candeub, supra note 61, at 2092 ("[O]ne cannot really be content
that one is properly identifying those mental properties - in one's own mind
- which one is analogizing into another's.")
106. See Cornwell, supra note 4, at 149 (averring that one's mental state is
really not in existence as most assume). More precisely, it should be seen as
"a conclusory label applied retrospectively to make sense of multiple streams
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determination is as theoretically difficult as trying to accurately
discern the meaning of a single statement without being able to
consider the speaker, the context, the historical implications of
that moment, or any other factor which we normally, albeit
subconsciously, ponder. 1 7 The state of mind of any individual is an
inner function that cannot be known to another."8 To cope with
this, we (including jurors) project our own internal constructs on
the accused and interpret his words and his story through our own
internal dictionary, defining the content in a way that fits within
our personal story-telling methodology.'0 9
An understanding of the power and limitations of narration
from both a philosophical and psychological perspective leads to
the ultimate conclusion that one person's intent in the commission
of a crime is difficult to ascertain. ° Requiring a jury of twelve
individuals to find as facts the "because of' part of the equation, or
the motivations and rationale for committing an act, is a
theoretically impossible feat."' This is the realm of the reason; it
is not one of fact." 2 It is a world of speculation and projection that

of consciousness." Id.

107. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 88, at 29e (pondering that even if one

had the ability to listen to the thoughts of another, it would be so out of
context that it could be compared to only being able to read one "sentence in
the middle of a story"). Taslitz recalled a demonstration of Wittgenstein's
which pointed out that "'seeing' initially is often 'seeing as."' Taslitz, supra
note 89, at 193. He noted that we do not see items as objective truths. Id.
Rather, the item is seen filtered through the viewers "interpretive framework."

Id.
108. See generally Candeub, supra note 61, at 2079-81 (discussing the "Other

Minds Problem" which shows that the results of trying to know another's mind
or internal thought processes is intrinsically inaccurate).
109. See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 4, at 2081 (promoting that an

individual's understanding of justice is hinged on the assumptions, values and
perceptions that he or she carries); see also Taslitz, supra note 89, at 210

(opining "mental state is a sound construct created by the defendant and the
jury").
110. See Candeub, supra note 61, at 2082 (identifying that assessing the
internal mental processes of another is beyond verifiable and according to
some, meaningless).

111. See, e.g., id. at 2122 (concluding that hate crime legislation leads to
arbitrary decisions because the basis of such decisions rests upon that which
cannot be ascertained with certainty and threatens the punishment of
thought). See also WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 88, at 88e ("The uncertainty

about the inner is an uncertainty about something outer.").
112. See, e.g., Cornwell, supra note 4, at 109 (declaring that juries, through

the projection of their own understanding of the world, translate even
scientific "causes" into the subjective realm of "reasons." Justice, therefore, is
a psychological concept because it is interwoven with a person's identity basis,
giving the concept and intended result meaning); see also Rutter, supra note

91, at 1035 (noting that language has its own world, distinct from the world of
behavior, which is the interactive world that nouns are made of: people, places
and things).
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is best left to thoughtful reflection. It should not be the basis for
criminal indictments.113
III. PROPOSAL: KEY CHANGE

In the advent of Apprendi"', the scope of hate crime
legislation must change. States must alter their laws to ensure
that they keep with the required standard; a sentencing judge can
no longer determine bias by a preponderance of the evidence." 5
Hate now must be considered an element of the crime and
determined by the fact finders beyond a reasonable doubt.11 6 Some
might consider this to be a valiant decision, believing that it offers
the accused more protection a higher burden of proof. 7
Consequently, the argument has been made that the United
States Supreme Court's decision affirms the constitutional rights
of those who stand accused."'
However, this analysis has its
faults, and they lie in the areas of psychology and philosophy.
Narrative psychology, and the legal scholars who have
embraced the power of narration in the courtroom, teaches us that
the stories told in our legal forums are fraught with interpretive
dilemmas. 9 There is a high degree of subjectivity involved in
113. See generally Candeub, supra note 61; Cornwell, supra note 4;
Scheppele, supra note 4.

114. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
115. Id. at 490.
116. Id.
117. See Richard J. Corry Jr., Burn This Article: It is Evidence in Your
Thought Crime Prosecution, 4 TEx. REV. LAW & POL. 461, 485-86 (2000)
(having examined the decision in Apprendi, Corry agrees with the Court's
determination that the additional question of whether there was bias involved
in the commission of a crime should become an element of the offense). He
argues that the constitutional element involved requires the constitutional
guarantee of a trial by jury. Id. Corry quotes the dissenting opinion from the
ruling of Apprendi in the New Jersey Supreme Court.
The critical determination required by the statute, that a defendant's
mental state in committing the subject offense encompassed a purpose
to intimidate because of race, necessarily involves a finding so integral
to the charged offense that it must be characterized as an element
thereof.
Moreover, the significantly increased sentencing range
triggered by that statute also persuades me that the finding of a purpose
to intimidate must be treated as a material element of the defendant's
crimes, and that the material element must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 486 (quoting from Apprendi v. N.J., 731 A.2d at 498). However, Corry
further opines that although the jury trial is necessary, his belief lies in the
fact that punishing bias actually serves to undermine one's protected
constitutional rights. Id.
118. Id. at 485-86.
119. See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 4, at 2085 (acknowledging that the
manner in which a story is told in the courtroom can dramatically affect the
outcome of the trial). See also Abrahamson, supra note 26, at 532 (stating
"[tihe law is not rigid. An issue can be stated in many ways and the way the
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attempting to construe these tales.1 20 Philosophy adds to the
picture by pointing out that the meaning of words are subjective,
and different people understand the same story in different ways
simply because of the intentions they attach to the words used.''
Most people recognize that certain attorneys' prime value lie in the
way they tell a story in the courtroom and their ability to influence
jurors. 22 It is the stuff from which legal legends are born.
A jury of one's peers may not be the most objective
determination of the truth beyond a reasonable doubt for the
subjective element of the crime, the requisite bias."3
Consequently, one must ponder alternatives.
If "beyond a
reasonable doubt" is actually an unreasonable standard for
assessing bias, what is the solution? Furthermore, the notion of
joining several people together to make a determination of bias
exacerbates, rather than alleviates, the problem. One possible
solution that comes to mind is returning to the analysis made by a
judge during the sentencing phase."4
Giving the judge the task of determining bias during the

issue is phrased often determines the answer").
120. See Finkel, supra note 65, at 774 (acknowledging that although the
"facts" of a case have some bearing on the way the legal story is told, it is not
in congruence with the way that most construe the inner workings of the
justice system). Finkel concludes with the observation that "[iln the final
analysis, it is less the role played by the evidence in the natural event than
the degree to which the evidence can be redefined and relocated within stories
and about the event that determines the outcome of a case." Id. See also
BROOKS, supra note 66, at 59. In interpreting Freud's comments on
psychoanalysis, Brooks asserts that "narrative truth" is measured by the
conviction of the storyteller and the logical flow and force of the story being
told. Id.
121. See generally Cornwell, supra note 4.
122. See Rutter, supra note 91, at 1305 (noting that a supraliminal
knowledge of the workings and structure of language can lead to a more
effective and mastered performance by those practicing in the legal arts).
123. See, e.g., Cornwell, supra note 4, at 138-39 (proposing that the only
issues that should be given to the jury to determine are those that are actually
determinable as facts). Those issues that are not objective facts, such as
volition in many circumstances, should be left to be decided by judges. Id.
124. Id. at 139-41. Cornwell advances the idea that judges are the best
candidates to review any issue at trial that is not a purely factual inquiry. Id.
at 139. However, Cornwell recommends a radical new criteria for the proper
judicial body to make such interpretive inquiries. Id. at 140-41. He suggests
that the proper background for a member of the judiciary is that of
philosopher or poet, for they are accustomed to the world of language and
metaphor that influence decisions based on the non-factual, and are equipped
with the "classic virtues such as courage, justice, wisdom, and temperance."
Id. at 141. But see Scott Phillips & Ryken Grattet, Judicial Rhetoric,
Meaning-Making, and the Institutionalization of Hate Crime Law, 34 L. &
SOC'Y REV. 567, 569 (2000) (asserting that a variety of studies support the idea
that judges are influenced by their own ideological stances and political views
in their decision-making capacity).
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sentencing period of the trial has inherent problems as well. First,
the Supreme Court in Apprendi just ruled on this issue and found
that this method of deciding punishment was unconstitutional and
unacceptable.
Second, there is the issue of subjectivity. Judges
are human and, despite their well-intentioned efforts, are
burdened with the same biases with which the rest of the
population struggles. 26 As our national community becomes more
refined, there is greater importance placed on correcting social
wrongs. This is admirable, and without a doubt, the correct path
for our civilization to take. But this sense of a moral "right," along
with social and political pressures, may influence judges to punish
alleged bias based on persuasion rather than fact.127
Crimes that are perpetrated by those who choose their victims
because they belong to a protected class should be punished. All
criminals should be punished. No one should be victimized. But
all victims have the same moral standing. 218 All victims are
members of the human race. 29 All victims are citizens of this
nation and the states in which they reside. The punishment for a
wrongdoing against one person should be the same as the
punishment for a wrongdoing against another.2 ° This is the
manner in which we might truly embrace equality in our nation.
All people are seen as equal under the laws and all receive equal
protection from the laws. In a similar regard, all those accused
can be assured of the fairest trial possible without the inherent
biases and subjectivity involved in the analysis of the "because of'
part of bias crime legislation.'
Arguably, all criminals act with hate in their hearts and
disregard for the rights and welfare of their victims. That is why
we punish criminals and those who do not abide by the laws.
Although the proponents of hate crime legislation arrive at their
vantage points from noble positions, hate crime legislation should
not exist. 12 Despite earnest social goals, the law must stand on
the most solid constitutional ground possible. 133 When we see laws

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
REV.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489-90 (2000).
See Phillips & Grattet, supra note 124, at 570.
See generally id; Scheppele, supra note 4, at 2085.
See Dillof, supra note 5, at 1034-35.
Id.
See Anthony M. Dillof, The Importance of Being Biased, 98 MICH. L.
1678, 1682 (2000) (opining that a person who commits a crime based on

racial animus is morally no more responsible than one who commits the same
offense without the racial motivation).
131. See Corry, supra note 117, at 488 (criticizing a bias crime being brought
to a jury because of possible unjust results due to trial procedures).

132. Id. at 487 (asserting that the goal of hate crime legislation is to punish
thoughts, but such legislation does not meet the goal of ending hatred).
133. See Phillips & Grattet, supra note 124, at 573-75 (delineating
constitutional arguments against bias crime legislation).
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that embrace highly subjective standards, we must do all that we
can to objectify the analysis."'
Although the United States
Supreme Court may have been trying to meet this goal by
increasing the burden of proof for enhancement statutes, it has
fallen short of the mark. Hate crime legislation that makes the
finding of bias an element of the crime increases, rather than
decreases, the sibjectivity involved in the analysis.'35 Those who
perpetrate crimes against individuals belonging to a protected
class should be punished in the same manner as those
perpetrating against any other human being.'36 The base crime
should be punished, not the additional element of bias. In this
manner our society can promote a safe environment for all of its
citizenry, send a message that anti-social behavior will not be
tolerated, and continue to uphold a tradition of fairness in the
judicial system.
IV. CONCLUSION
Hate and bias are not new phenomenon in our nation's
history.137 As we continue to attempt to correct past injustices and
ensure a "more perfect Union"13 for all of the inhabitants of the
United States, we try to incorporate these values into our system
of national jurisprudence. The recent tide of hate crime legislation
is an attempt to meet these goals. 9
Because of the relative
newness of this type of law, the Supreme Court has rendered
several important rulings in the past decade on the subject, the
most recent being found in Apprendi."4 °
Although Apprendi
focused on the narrow issue of sentencing enhancement statutes,
it was framed in a "bias crime" perspective and has an impact on
the manner in which states can punish criminals motivated by
bias.'
Since Apprendi, states are required to frame their hate
crime statutes in a manner that treats the bias as an element of
the crime."'
However, the need for the court or the fact finders to delve

134. See generally Cornwell, supra note 4.
135. See Corry, supra note 117, at 470 (noting that several suspect
evidentiary issues are involved in analyzing hate crimes, including the
necessity to try to determine the thoughts of another, the influence the media

has over such cases and the impact of interest groups upon the media, as well
as the possibility that the crime was fabricated for social or pecuniary gain).
136. See Dillof, supra note 130, at 1682.
137. See generally JENNINGS & BREWSTER, supra note 12.

138. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
139. See generally Taslitz, supra note 26.
140. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Wisconsin v.

Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377
(1992).
141. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475.

142. Id. at 2362-63.
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into the human mind to determine the rationale behind the
43
accused's actions has made this type of legislation suspect.'
Narrative psychology teaches us that the "story" behind a person's
actions is more complex than initially meets the eye."' The stories
told are subjective, and the backgrounds of the jurors are
influential in their interpretation of such stories. 45 Adding the
lessons of philosophy to the picture, it is evident that words
Moreover, the
themselves are prone to different interpretations.
human reasons that motivate people are quite different from the
more objective stance of "causes.
Adding all of these factors together, the trial of an accused for
a bias based offense is prone to a more subjective analysis than
other types of wrongs. The actions in the courtroom can be likened
to an interpretive dance, and the audience members, the jurors,
are charged with the task of finding~the meaning of the piece
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 48 This is neither fair nor just. Our
country should continue to find ways to combat indecencies
against all people, but should do so with a strong backing of the
The
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
the
fit
within
does
not
crime
legislation
of
hate
dance
interpretive
that
values
the
noble
Despite
Constitution.
choreography of the
these legislative measures embrace, reverence must be paid to the
higher values of the Constitution. The base crime should be
punished. The mindset of the accused should not.

143. See Candeub, supra note 61, at 2116.
144. See Finkel, supra note 65, at 776 (promoting the idea that a real truth
is non-existent and the construct of truth is really likened to that of a story).
145. Id.at 778 (explaining that jurors attempt to explain the information
proposed at trial through interpretation which renders a story that they are
able to comprehend).
146. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 88, at 28e. See also Rutter, supra note 91,

at 1328 (noting that "to the extent that one thinks in language, especially at
the more abstract levels with no counterpart in directly sensed experience, the
vagueness of language may be accompanied by vagueness in thinking").
147. See Cornwell, supra note 4, at 115-17.
148. See generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).

